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Abstract
We develop a behavioral exchange rate model with chartists and funda-
mentalists to study cyclical behavior in foreign exchange markets. Within our
model, the market impact of fundamentalists depends on the strength of their
belief in fundamental analysis. Estimation of a STAR GARCH model shows
that the more the exchange rate deviates from its fundamental value, the more
fundamentalists leave the market. In contrast to previous ndings, our paper
indicates that due to the nonlinear presence of fundamentalists, market stability
decreases with increasing misalignments. A stabilization policy such as central
bank interventions may help to deate bubbles.1. Introduction 
Recent empirical studies (Sarantis 1999, Taylor and Peel 2000, Taylor et al. 2001, 
Chortareas  et  al.  2002)  reveal  evidence  of  nonlinear  mean  reversion  in  foreign 
exchange markets. The statistical findings are obtained by applying relatively new 
nonlinear methods such as the smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) family of 
models. STAR models imply the existence of two distinct regimes in exchange 
rates, with potentially different dynamic properties, but the transition between the 
regimes  is smooth.  Cyclical  motion  is  also  detected  on  stock  markets (Sarantis 
2001,  Nam  et  al.  2001,  2002).  Sarantis  (1999)  and  Kilian  and  Taylor  (2001) 
presume that agent heterogeneity may be a cause for nonlinear mean reversion in 
the price process. 
Interactions  between  chartists  and  fundamentalists  may  indeed  generate 
cyclical  dynamics.  In  Day  and  Huang  (1990),  Chiarella  (1992),  Chiarella  et  al. 
(2002)  and  Farmer  and  Joshi  (2002),  heterogeneous  traders  rely  on  nonlinear 
trading rules to determine their orders. Frankel and Froot (1986), Kirman (1991), 
Brock and Hommes (1998) and Lux and Marchesi (1999) derive nonlinearities by 
the traders´ switching between technical and fundamental forecast rule. Which kind 
of  predictor  an  agent  applies  depends  on  past  realized  profits  and  on  social 
interactions. According to the chartist-fundamentalist approach, the price process is 
therefore not only driven by exogenous news, but is at least partially due to an 
endogenous  nonlinear  law  of  motion.  These  theoretical  models  have  shown 
considerable success in replicating the stylized facts of financial markets such as 
excess  volatility,  fat  tails  for  the  distribution  of  the  returns,  and  volatility 
clustering.
Our paper aims at relating both strands of the literature more closely. We 
present a simple behavioral model with chartists and fundamentalists to explore 
nonlinearities and cyclical movements in exchange rates. To be precise, agents rely 
on linear trading rules and the market impact of chartists is fixed. However, the 
strength of fundamental trading varies over time. Estimation of the model using 
daily data for the major currencies vis-á-vis the US dollar demonstrates that if the 
exchange rate disconnects from its fundamental value, fundamentalists lose their 
confidence in the usefulness of their trading rule and consequently abstain from 
trading.  Put  differently,  if  the  distance  between  the  exchange  rate  and  its 
fundamental value decreases – as predicted by fundamental analysis – they re-enter 
the market.
 Overall,  our  model  indicates  that  foreign  exchange  markets  become 
increasingly  unstable  during  bubbles.  The  diminishing  force  of  fundamentalists 
alone may not suffice to bring exchange rates back in line. Our paper may thus help 
explain the lasting misalignment of the US dollar in the mid 1980s. Exogenous 
shocks are necessary to end a bubble. Such an impulse may, however, be triggered 
by central bank interventions. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop 
a simple chartist-fundamentalist model. Section 3 presents empirical analysis of 
three daily US dollar exchange rates. The final section concludes the paper.
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Exchange rates are determined on an order-driven market. Demand for currency is 
expressed  in  terms  of  market  orders,  that  is,  traders  ask  for  an  immediate 
transaction at the best available price. All orders are filled by market makers at an 
exchange rate that is shifted from the previous exchange rate by an amount that 
depends on the excess demand. Following Farmer and Joshi (2002), we assume a 
log-linear price impact function
t
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t t
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where St is the log of the exchange rate at time t and a
M is a positive reaction 
coefficient of the market maker. The excess demand is given as the sum of the 
orders  of  chartists  Dt
C  and  fundamentalists  Dt
F.  The  transactions  of  funda-
mentalists  are  weighted  by  their  market  impact  Wt.  According  to  (2.1),  buying 
drives the exchange rate up and selling drives it down. The noise term ￿t captures 
all  additional  perturbations  that  may  affect  the  market  maker´s  price  setting 
decision.
Survey  studies  such  as Taylor and Allen (1992) confirm that professional 
foreign exchange traders rely on technical and fundamental analysis to determine 
their orders. Technical trading rules aim at identifying trading signals out of past 
price  movements  (Murphy  1999).  Technical  analysis  suggests  buying  (selling) 
when  prices  increase  (decrease).  The  excess  demand  of  chartists  may  be 
approximated as
) ( 1 ￿ ￿ = t t
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t S S a D ,                                                                                           (2.2) 
where a
C is a positive reaction coefficient. Spurgin (1999) and Lequeux and Acar 
(1998) point out that leverage currency fund managers tend to be trend-followers 
too.
Fundamental analysis presumes that exchange rates converge towards their 
fundamental values. The excess demand of fundamentalists may be expressed as
) ( t t
F F
t S F a D ￿ = ,                                                                                              (2.3) 
where  a
F  is  a  positive  reaction  coefficient  and  F  stands  for  the  log  of  the 
fundamental value. According to Xu (2001) and Euromoney (2003) such behavior 
is  quite  common  among  fund  managers.  Hawker  (2002)  reports  that  buying 
(selling) undervalued (overvalued) currencies – as measured by the Bic Mac Index  
– may generate positive trading returns. Note that excess demand functions such as 
(2.2)  and  (2.3)  are  regularly  employed in theoretical models to characterize the 
behavior of traders (Hommes 2001).
The evolution of the fundamental value is due to the news arrival process. Its 
log follows an arithmetic Brownian motion
t t t ￿ F F + = +1 .                                                                                                      (2.4) 
News incorporated in ￿t is iid Normal with mean zero and time invariant variance.
Our  setting  is  novel  in  the  way  we  model  the  market  impact  of 
fundamentalists. We assume that there exists a pool of latent agents who may use 
fundamental analysis. The number of these agents engaged in trading depends on 
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distance  between  the  exchange  rate  and  its  fundamental  value  increases, 
fundamental analysis wrongly predicts the sign of the exchange rate change. In 
such  a  situation,  the  agents  disregard  fundamental  analysis.  Conversely,  if 
misalignments  decrease,  fundamental  analysis  delivers  correct  predictions  and 
regains  its  popularity.  Second,  misalignments  are  conditioned  on  volatility.  If 
exchange rate fluctuations decline, fundamentalists expect mean reversion to be 
less likely (adjustments without volatility are, of course, impossible).
Putting the arguments together, we formalize the belief function as
S
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Since, ￿ > 0,  Bt  is  bounded  between –￿  and  0.  The  belief  function  reaches  its 
maximum  at  F = S.  In  a  high  volatility  regime,  measured  by  the  conditional 
exchange rate standard deviation ￿t
S, a given departure |F–S| leads to a low loss of 
confidence  in  fundamental  analysis  and  vice  versa.  Let  us  normalize  the  belief 
function into market shares 
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with 0￿W￿1. The market impact of fundamentalists obviously increases in B. The 
fraction of agents who abstain from trading is given by (1–W).
Combining (2.1)￿(2.6), the solution for the exchange rate is
t t t t t t t t ￿ S F W ￿ S S ￿ S S + ￿ + ￿ + = ￿ + ) ( ) ( 1 1 ,                                                     (2.7) 
where ￿=a
Ma
C and ￿=a
Ma
F.
Before we turn to the econometric part of this paper, let us briefly clarify 
the impact of the fundamentalists on the dynamics. The left-hand side panel of 
figure 1 shows the fundamentalists´ market shares as a function of the distance 
between the exchange rate and its fundamental value for different values of ￿. The 
higher ￿, the more quickly the agents abstain from trading as the distance between 
the exchange rate and its fundamental value increases (from top to bottom: ￿=0.02, 
￿=0.05, ￿=0.08). 
In such a situation, the fundamental trading rule simultaneously suggests to 
take a larger position. So, what is the joint impact of the fundamentalists? The 
right-hand side panel of figure 1 displays the product of the market shares and the 
demand  generated  by  the  fundamental  trading  rule  (again  from  top  to  bottom:        
￿=0.02, ￿=0.05, ￿=0.08). As can be seen, the effective demand first increases, but 
then drops again. Clearly, if no fundamentalist remains in the market, their demand 
becomes zero. Note that the lower ￿, the stronger is the stabilizing impact of the 
fundamentalists. 
In  how  far  the  fundamentalists  are  indeed  able  to  stabilize  foreign   
exchange markets is an econometric question, which will be explored in the next 
section.
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market shares of active fundamentalists as a function of the distance between the 
exchange rate and its fundamental value for different values of ￿. From top to 
bottom: ￿=0.02, ￿=0.05, ￿=0.08. The right-hand side panel displays the product 
of the market shares and the demand generated by the fundamental trading rule. 
From top to bottom: ￿=0.02, ￿=0.05, ￿=0.08. We set a
F=1 and ￿
S=1.
3. Specification and Estimation of the Model
3.1 Specification of the model
The  aim  of  this  section  is  to  investigate  nonlinearities  in  daily  dollar  nominal 
exchange  rates  on  the  basis  of  the  above  theoretical  approach.  Our  approach 
belongs to the STAR (Smooth Transition Autoregressive) model family, originally 
proposed by Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992) and developed further by Granger and 
Teräsvirta  (1993)  and  Teräsvirta  (1994).  These  models  have  been  applied  to 
quarterly and monthly exchange rates by Sarantis (1999), Kilian and Taylor (2000), 
Taylor  and  Peel  (2000)  and  Taylor  et  al.  (2001).  These  show  nonlinear  mean 
reversion of the real exchange rate and provide superior performance in an out-of-
sample  context  compared  to  the  random  walk  benchmark  and  other  competing 
approaches such as the Markov switching model. 
In  order  to  examine  the  empirical  evidence  of  the  chartist-fundamentalist 
model  outlined  in  section  2,  we  use  daily  data,  implying  that  the  conditional 
variance of exchange rate returns cannot be treated as constant over time. To cope 
with  the  heteroskedastic  properties  of  daily  exchange  rate  returns  we  apply  the 
STAR GARCH procedure developed by Lundbergh and Teräsvirta (1998). 
To be specific, our empirical model consists of a mean equation containing a 
smooth transition variable and a standard GARCH(1,1) volatility equation: 
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iid
t & ~  N(0,1).  Remember  that  the  parameter  ￿  in  (3.1) 
stands  for  the  time  invariant  impact  of  the  chartists.  Due  to  the  interest  parity 
condition, a significant fraction of daily exchange rate changes might be explained 
by changes of the interest differential. Since this is clearly not a matter of chartist 
and fundamentalist speculation, the mean equation is augmented by the interest 
differential IDt. The relative number of fundamentalists who are engaged in trading 
( ) 1 1 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ t t t h ; S F ; W ￿   is  bounded  between  zero  and  unity  and  depends  on  the 
transition  variable  1 1 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ t t t h / S F .  The  transition  parameter  ￿  is  a  slope 
parameter and determines the speed of transition between the two extreme regimes, 
with low absolute values of ￿ resulting in slower transition. Remember that for 
￿ = 0, all fundamentalists enter the market and when ￿ ’ ￿,  ( ) 1 1 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ t t t h ; S F ; W ￿
becomes  a  step  function.  Since  (3.2)  is  a  linear  transformation  of  the  standard 
logistic  transition  function  proposed by  Teräsvirta  and  Anderson  (1992),  robust 
standard errors may be derived. To capture heteroskedasticity in daily exchange 
rate  returns  we  specify  the  conditional  volatility  as  a  standard  GARCH(1,1) 
process.
3.2 Data description
We use daily spot US dollar exchange rates against the British pound (BP), the 
German mark (DM), and the Japanese yen (YEN) over the period from 1980:1:1 to 
1996:12:31  to  calculate  percentage  exchange  rate  returns  as  100￿(St).
1  Table  1 
provides some descriptive statistics showing standard properties of exchange rate 
returns such as skewness and excess kurtosis. 
Theinterestdifferentialattimetiscalculatedas IDt=log(1+it)–log(1+it
*), where it
is the daily overnight US dollar interest rate and it
* is the daily overnight interest 
rate of the BP, DM and YEN, respectively. We assume that the fundamental value 
can  be  described  by  purchasing  power  parity  (ppp).  Taylor  and  Allen  (1992) 
provide evidence from survey data that foreign exchange market participants in fact 
accept  ppp  as  a  valid  relationship  in  the  long  run.  Monthly  observations  of 
consumer price indices (cpi) for the US, the UK, Germany and Japan were taken 
from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics database 
to  construct  ppp  as log (cpi
*) – log (cpi
US).  We transform ppp data to the daily 
frequency,  taking  the  observed  value  for  the  entire  month,  which  seems  to  be 
compatible with the information environment of a market participant in a daily 
trading context.
2 The (log) exchange rate and the cpi series were normalized on 
values  of  1990:01:02,  assuming  that  ppp  holds  at  the  beginning  of  the  1990s. 
However, to adjust the model for a possible misleading normalization of the data 
we estimate a shift parameter (, so that  ￿ ppp F t t ￿ = . For the sake of parsimony 
1 The price of one US dollar is in units of foreign currency. We thank Christopher Neely for making 
the data set available.
2  To check whether or not the estimation results are driven by this simplifying assumption we 
experimented with interpolated data. According to standard unit root tests, the ppp values have also 
been interpolated as an I(1) process. However, the estimation results do not change significantly. 
5 Westerhoff and Reitz: Nonlinearities and Cyclical Behavior
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003we  decided  on  the  basis  of  likelihood  ratio  tests  (5  percent  level)  to  remove  a 
statistically insignificant parameter ( from the estimation equation.
Table 1: Summary statistics of the dollar spot exchange rate returns (in percent) 
from 1980:01:02 to 1996:12:31.
BP DM YEN
Observations 4431 4431 4431
Mean 0.006  –0.002  –0.016
Standard deviation 0.668 0.688 0.641
Skewness 0.065 (0.08) –0.129 (0.00) –0.382 (0.00)
Excess Kurtosis 3.083 (0.00) 2.143 (0.00) 2.957 (0.00)
Lbq(1) 14.52 (0.00)  4.98 (0.03)  4.66 (0.03)
Lbq(2) 16.91 (0.00)  5.61 (0.06)  5.45 (0.06)
Lbq(3) 17.10 (0.00)  6.10 (0.11)  7.14 (0.07)
Lbq(4) 17.19 (0.00)  6.33 (0.18)  8.01 (0.09)
Lbq(5) 24.26 (0.00)  8.79 (0.12)  9.64 (0.09)
Lbq
2(1) 44.49 (0.00) 52.58 (0.00) 24.63 (0.00)
Lbq
2(2) 94.74 (0.00) 83.01 (0.00) 42.70 (0.00)
Lbq
2(3) 140.81 (0.00) 118.46 (0.00) 86.58 (0.00)
Lbq
2(4) 211.45 (0.00) 145.29 (0.00) 94.26 (0.00)
Lbq
2(5) 259.45 (0.00) 185.60 (0.00) 118.39 (0.00)
JB 1759 (0.00) 861 (0.00) 1722 (0.00)
Notes: Lbq(L) and Lbq
2(L) denote the Ljung Box-Q statistics for the returns and the squared 
returns, respectively. JB denotes the Jarque Bera test statistic. p-values are in parantheses. 
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We  use  RATS  5.0  programming  for  the  quasi  maximum  likelihood  estimation 
method.  Since  the  assumption  of  conditional  normality  cannot  be  maintained, 
robust  estimates  of  the  covariance  matrices  of  the  parameter  estimates  are 
calculated using the BFGS algorithm. Under fairly weak conditions, the resulting 
estimates are even consistent when the conditional distribution of the residuals is 
non-normal (Bollerslev and Wooldridge 1992). Teräsvirta (1994) points out that 
estimating the transition parameter ￿ may cause particular problems such as slow 
convergence  of  the  estimation  routine  or  overestimation.  However,  the 
recommended  rescaling  of  the  transition  variable  by  means  of  the  conditional 
standard deviation is already introduced due to theoretical considerations. On the 
basis of this standardization, we set ￿ = 1 as a starting value for the estimation 
routine.
3
The estimation results in table 2 are quite similar to each other, indicating 
that the specified model is robust when applied to different exchange rates. The 
parameter of the interest differential is statistically significant at the one percent 
level  in  either  case,  but  of  the  wrong  sign  with  respect  to  the  interest  parity 
condition.  For  the  period  under  consideration,  this  is  a  familiar  result  in  the 
empirical finance literature (Lewis 1995). Concerning the shift parameter ( the data 
normalization on the basis of 1990 values seems to be appropriate in the case of the 
BP  and  the  DM.  For  the  dollar/yen  exchange  rate,  in  contrast,  the  estimated 
fundamental value is significantly lower than ppp on the basis of 1990 values. 
We now turn to the central question as to whether there is evidence in favor 
of chartist- and fundamentalist-driven exchange rate dynamics. The answer is given 
by the likelihood ratio test statistics and the t – statistics of the respective parameter 
estimates.  To  provide  likelihood  ratio  test  statistics  we  also  estimate  the  above 
model,  restricting  the  chartist  and  fundamentalist  parameters  to  zero,  i.e.                
￿ = ￿ = ￿ = 0. The resulting test statistics reported in the last line of table 2. They 
show that the introduction of chartist and fundamentalist parameters increase the 
log likelihood with significance levels of one percent in the case of the DM and the 
YEN, but only at the ten percent level in the case of the BP.
The chartist and fundamentalist coefficients are of the correct sign and are 
statistically significant at least at the five percent level, except for chartist trading 
in  the  dollar/yen  market  and  fundamentalist  trading  in  the  dollar/BP  market. 
Statistically significant estimates of ￿ point to moderate transition between regimes 
in the case of Germany and Japan. Traders in the dollar/BP market change their 
confidence  in  fundamental  analysis  more  quickly  to  observed  departures  of  the 
exchange rate from ppp. 
This is also visible in figure 2, which displays the dynamics of confidence in 
fundamental analysis measured as the relative number of fundamentalists in the 
foreign  exchange  market.  In  fact,  the  market  impact  of  fundamentalists  in  the 
dollar/BP markets switches back and forth quite rapidly whereas in the dollar/DM 
and  the  dollar/YEN  market  the  strength  of  fundamentalists  varies  more  slowly. 
Note  that  the  strong  dollar  appreciation  against  all  other  currencies  was 
3 Experimentation showed that the results reported in the text are robust with respect to various 
starting values.
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exchange rate. Less than ten percent of potentially active fundamentalists were in 
the market when the dollar peaked in mid 1985.
To sum up, one may conclude that estimation results provide support for the 
heterogeneous agents approach outlined in section 2. 
Table 2: Parameter estimates of (STAR) GARCH models for the dollar spot 
exchange rate of the BP, DM, and YEN (1980 – 1996).
BP DM YEN
) ))) 2.61 (2.73)
*** 3.03 (3.30)
*** 2.71 (3.58)
***
￿ ￿￿￿ 0.04  (2.36)
** 0.03  (2.37)
** 0.02  (1.87)
*
￿ ￿￿￿ 0.019 (1.78)
* 0.004 (2.34)
** 0.004 (2.26)
**
( ((( – – 27.02  (3.20)
***
￿ ￿￿￿ 0.172 (2.48)
** 0.035 (2.34)
** 0.021 (3.17)
***
$ $$$0 0.004  (2.71)
*** 0.011  (4.03)
*** 0.013  (2.67)
***
$ $$$
1
0.047 (6.22)
*** 0.069 (7.93)
*** 0.052 (4.54)
***
$ $$$
2
0.945 (101.9)
*** 0.909 (79.47)
*** 0.916 (41.64)
***
LLh – 112.13 – 313.53 – 82.64
LRT 6.92
* 21.18
*** 17.82
***
Notes: The sample contains daily observations of the dollar spot exchange rate against the DM,
the BP and the YEN from January 1980 to December 1996. ￿, ￿, ), (, indicate the estimated 
parameters of the mean equations (in percent), $0, $1, and $2 are the estimated GARCH(1,1) 
parameters (in percent), LLh is the log likelihood value and LRT the likelihood ratio test statistic 
with restrictions ￿ = ￿ = ￿ = 0. t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust estimates of the 
covariance matrices of the parameter estimates. * (**, ***) denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 
1%) level.
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1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Germany  (1990:01:02 = 0):
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Japan (1990:01:02 = 0.27):
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
-0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Figure 2: Log dollar real exchange rates and relative number of fundamentalists. 
Daily data form 1980:01:02 to 1996:12:31.
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We perform diagnostics with the Ljung-Box Q tests on the standardized residuals 
and the squared standardized residuals from each of the three exchange rates. The 
Ljung-Box Q statistics AR(p) in table 3 check serial correlation in the standar-
dized  residuals,  while  the  ARCH(p)  statistics  check  serial  dependence  in  the 
conditional variance.
The reported p-values indicate that the model is able to capture the serial 
dependence  of  the  conditional  mean  and  variance  process.  However,  the 
diagnostics reveal a familiar problem in STAR GARCH models. In the case of the 
DM and the BP, the Jarque Bera test statistic of the standardized residuals is indeed 
lower than those of the raw returns, but still indicate a persisting nonnormality. In 
the case of the YEN it is even slightly higher (Lundbergh and Teräsvirta, 1998). 
Table 3: Estimation diagnostics.
BP DM YEN
AR(1) 0.68 (0.41) 0.66 (0.41) 0.39 (0.53)
AR(2) 3.17 (0.20) 1.88 (0.39) 1.33 (0.51)
AR(3) 3.49 (0.32) 2.88 (0.41) 4.62 (0.20)
AR(4) 3.69 (0.45) 5.27 (0.26) 5.34 (0.25)
AR(5) 6.63 (0.25) 8.52 (0.13) 7.38 (0.19)
ARCH(1) 0.19 (0.66) 0.00 (0.97) 0.52 (0.47)
ARCH(2) 0.49 (0.78) 2.16 (0.34) 0.59 (0.74)
ARCH(3) 2.30 (0.51) 2.16 (0.54) 2.89 (0.41)
ARCH(4) 2.64 (0.62) 3.69 (0.45) 4.88 (0.30)
ARCH(5) 3.26 (0.66) 4.22 (0.52) 5.45 (0.36)
JB 712 (0.00) 411 (0.00) 1750 (0.00)
Notes: AR(p) denotes the Ljung-Box statistic for serial correlation of the residuals out to p lags. 
ARCH(q)  denotes  the  Ljung-Box  statistic  for  serial  correlation  of  the  standardized  squared 
residuals out to q lags. JB denotes the Jarque Bera test statistic. p-values are in parantheses.
4 Conclusions
We  present  a  simple  nonlinear  exchange  rate  model  with  chartists  and 
fundamentalists to study nonlinear mean reversion in foreign exchange markets. 
Within our model, the market impact of fundamentalists depends on the strength of 
their belief in fundamental analysis. Empirical evidence is provided, applying a 
10 Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics Vol. 7 [2003], No. 4, Article 3
http://www.bepress.com/snde/vol7/iss4/art3STAR GARCH model to daily US dollar spot exchange rates against the German 
mark, the British pound and the Japanese yen. Statistically significant parameter 
estimates of the transition variable show that the more the exchange rate deviates 
from  purchasing  power  parity  (ppp),  the  lower  the  remaining  number  of 
fundamentalists in the foreign exchange market. Put differently, if the exchange 
rate converges towards the ppp value – as predicted by fundamental analysis –
fundamentalists re-enter the market. The loss of confidence in ppp is accelerated 
when low conditional volatility makes mean reversion appear more unlikely. 
Our results throw some doubt on the often presumed stabilizing impact of 
fundamentalists on exchange rates (see also the argument put forward in De Long 
et  al.  1990).  Fundamentalists  leave  the  market  as  distortions  grow.  Instead  of 
countering  the  activity  of  chartists,  mean  reversion  pressure  weakens  so  that 
bubbles may gain additional momentum. Indeed, we observe strong and persistent 
periods of misalignments. 
Our model suggests that by breaking a destabilizing exchange rate trend via 
interventions,  a  central  bank  may  encourage  fundamental  trading  again.  This 
hypothesis may be tested in a simulation analysis. Given the fact that our model is 
supported by the data, one may even expect to obtain reasonable results from such 
an exercise. We think that such an analysis could be a promising line for future 
research.
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